This article examines the legal methodology that courts have to employ when they construe domestic law in accordance with European Union directives. It demonstrates that the CJEU has set up autonomous "European methodological rules". These rules apply together with national legal methods. The relationship between both regimes can be described with the concepts of 
INTRODUCTION
The duty of judges to interpret domestic law in accordance with EU directives has stepped out of the shadow of direct effect and supremacy into the limelight of European Union law. What started as a tool that remedies the absence of a directly effective provision in a directive 1 The current literature on the methodology of consistent interpretation can roughly be grouped into two strands. Some academics argue that a judge is required to construe domestic legislation within the scope of a directive solely on the basis of national legal standards. 3 Other scholars claim that the EU legal duty of consistent interpretation affects and limits, to a certain extent, domestic rules of construction. 4 Yet, these scholars do not explain how, exactly to what extent, and why this happens. 
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with national rules of statutory construction resulting in a hybrid methodology. The article resolves the seeming paradox that the CJEU can refer to domestic standards and at the same time intervene in the methodology of consistent interpretation by stipulating European methodological rules. The article also refers to judgments of English 6 and German courts to assess whether Member States' courts apply and accept European methodological rules.
The remainder of the article will be structured as follows. Part two discusses the principle of equivalence and its shortcomings to guarantee the effectiveness of directives. The third part revisits the CJEU's case law on consistent interpretation and outlines European methodological rules. Part four examines the meaning of the contra legem limit of consistent interpretation and resolves some misunderstandings about it. The fifth part provides a theoretical framework for the relationship between European methodological rules and national principles of statutory construction. Based on this relationship, part six submits that the principle of consistent interpretation has a hybrid methodology. The article concludes with a summary.
2.
PRINCIPLE OF EQUIVALENCE
It is settled case law since the CJEU's Grand Chamber judgment in Pfeiffer that domestic courts can apply their "interpretative methods recognised by national law" when they interpret domestic law in conformity with a directive. 7 Yet, Pfeiffer did not leave national rules of construction untouched. The German Law at issue was adopted in order to transpose the 6 The term "English courts" will be used to refer to the courts of England and Wales and the term "English law" will be used to refer to the legal system governing England and Wales. The effect of the EU legal duty of consistent interpretation on English law as described in this article remains the same as long as the European Communities Act 1972 is in force and the UK is a member of the EU. is incompatible with art. 6(2) of the Working Time Directive. 8 Thus, s. 3 of the German Law on working time read on its own complied with EU law, whereas s. 7(1)(i) did not. 9 Regarding the duty of consistent interpretation, the CJEU held that "if the application of interpretative methods recognised by national law enables, in certain circumstances, a provision of domestic law to be construed in such a way as to avoid conflict with another rule of domestic law or the scope of that provision to be restricted to that end by applying it only in so far as it is compatible with the rule concerned, the national court is bound to use those methods in order to achieve the result sought by the directive."
10
In effect, the CJEU asked the referring German court to look for and apply a national rule of construction which restricts the scope of s. 7(1)(i) so that s. 3 of the German Law on working time applies to the case at issue.
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What the CJEU also demands in this part of its ruling is that a national court must not fall short of applying the same range of interpretative rules for consistent interpretation that is available to the court when it construes purely domestic law (principle of equivalence 
rules set an EU-wide standard, but they do not provide for a complete methodological order.
Outside their limited scope, national principles apply and govern the methodology of consistent interpretation. The European methodological rules are committed to the full effectiveness of directives and to improving the uniform application of directives in the EU.
A. Interpretative priority of the directive-consistent meaning
The CJEU has required in Chamber and Grand Chamber rulings that a domestic court must favour the interpretation of the national legislation which is the most consistent with the result sought by the directive in order to thereby achieve an outcome compatible with the provisions of the directive. The Court has applied this methodological rule to legislation pre-dating or post-dating an applicable directive. 18 What the CJEU requires is in effect that the interpretative result (meaning) which complies with a directive must be given priority over all other possible but inconsistent meanings. 
(i) Scope of application
The CJEU has so far required national courts to employ the presumption of compliance in two situations. On the one hand, the Grand Chamber in Pfeiffer demonstrates that the presumption applies to the interpretation of legislation which is specifically enacted for the purpose of 11 of 36 transposing a directive into domestic law. 26 On the other hand, the presumption applies to the interpretation of legislation pre-dating a directive if the Member State does not consider it necessary to amend its law in order to bring it into line with the applicable directive because it (mistakenly) considers the pre-existing legislation to already satisfy the requirements of the directive concerned, which was the case in the CJEU's Fifth Chamber ruling in Wagner
Miret. 27 The key significance of the presumption is that a court must assume that the national legislature intended to comply entirely with the requirements of the directive. 28 The main case of the application of the presumption thus occurs when the legislature transposes a directive into domestic law without clarifying that specific substantive objectives in the implementing act comply with the directive. Since it must be assumed that the legislature intended to implement the directive entirely, a court which interprets a specific statutory provision of the implementing act must assume that the legislature had the intention to only enact consistent objectives. 
(ii) Rebuttal of the presumption
The question of whether or not the presumption applies must be differentiated from the rebuttal of the presumption. 32 The presumption can be negated by evidence to the contrary, for example,
by showing that the national legislature intended to depart from specific provisions of the directive. Hence, the presumption is rebutted if the legislature implements the directive in general but deliberately decides to keep or enact an inconsistent specific objective. How, then, must the legislature express such an intention? Does this intention have to be plain from the wording of the enactment or does it suffice if this intention can be discerned using the whole body of interpretative criteria recognised by domestic law? In other words, can the presumption only be rebutted by express words or also by implication? In the absence of CJEU case law on the matter, this question is governed by national legal methods. 33 It is submitted here that the presumption of compliance can only be rebutted if a national court reaches an outer limit of 14 of 36 consistent interpretation which bars the directive-consistent meaning. That means that the ultimate answer to the question of how the presumption of compliance can be refuted is to be found in the contra legem limit of consistent interpretation, which will be explored in the next part of this article.
A held that unless the domestic court found such an indication, the EU legal duty of consistent interpretation does not require the court to apply the domestic provision retrospectively because such an obligation would require the court to infringe the contra legem limit. general intention of the legislature without breaching the contra legem limit. Specific legislative intent is given priority over general intentions of the legislature according to national legal methodology. 42 It follows that a specific objective which inadvertently contradicts a directive-consistent meaning would rebut the presumption of compliance if the presumption were without the priority element. This would lead to the result that the inconsistent meaning is the only possible meaning of the enactment. In such a case, the interpretative priority rule would not apply. If the presumption of compliance contains the priority element, however, the presumption is not rebutted and a consistent interpretation remains possible. In this example, the presumption of compliance intervenes in national legal methods and provides for a legislature specifically intended to contradict the directive. Therefore, the CJEU's reasoning in Björnekulla leaves open the possibility that the enactment as interpreted in its context, which includes the travaux préparatoires, can only be given one meaning which does not comply with the directive since the legislature deliberately intended to depart from certain requirements of the directive. In this case, the contra legem limit of consistent interpretation is reached and the presumption of compliance is rebutted.
4.
THE CONTRA LEGEM LIMIT
The European duty of consistent interpretation does not oblige 43 a judge to construe national legislation contra legem. 44 The contra legem limit has a functional meaning. It enshrines the principle that a judge is bound by statute. It provides, it is submitted, that a barrier exists which separates permissible judicial interpretation from impermissible judicial legislation which lies outside of a court's jurisdiction. 45 A contra legem construction surpasses the outer limits of the judicial function. The contra legem limit has a constitutional dimension and presupposes a separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislature. concerned" 52 or (b) contradicts its "ordinary" meaning 53 . Such an understanding of the contra legem limit would infringe the principle of equivalence if judicial law-making, that is to say, the interpretation of a provision which goes beyond or against its wording, is possible and within the bounds of the judicial function of a Member State. If national legal methodology recognises that legislation can be construed against its ordinary meaning under specific circumstances, the contra legem limit does not bite if these circumstances are met.
The contra legem limit is principally but not fully determined by domestic law.
54
National autonomy is confined by European methodological rules. The presumption of compliance in particular has the ability to influence, to "stretch" or to shift the contra legem limit. 55 A hypothetical example of a shifting of the contra legem limit was given in the previous part of this article. 21 of 36 the national separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary. A stretching of the contra legem limit has occurred in Germany. 56 Under German law, the contra legem limit of (consistent) interpretation is surpassed when a court contravenes the wording of an enactment and the clearly identifiable intention of the legislature (the so-called 'double criterion'). 57 The legislative history of an implementing act, which is a permissible aid to statutory interpretation in Germany, can contain specific objectives of an enactment. If these objectives are inadvertently inconsistent with EU law, applying the presumption of compliance entails that an intention of the legislature to depart from the directive's requirements will regularly not be clearly discernible. Relying on the presumption does not modify the double criterion; it does not shift the contra legem limit. However, it affects the double criterion as the element relating to the clearly identifiable intention of the legislature will regularly be absent. Applying the presumption of compliance thus significantly stretches the contra legem limit and de facto increases the power of the judiciary to find a consistent meaning.
The relationship between national rules of construction and European methodological rules with regard to the contra legem limit is overlooked by scholars who assert that unambiguous 56 For a more critical view and the claim that the European presumption of compliance leads to a de facto and inadmissible shift of the national contra legem limit in Germany, see Schürnbrand, "Die Grenzen richtlinienkonformer Rechtsfortbildung 
B. Exception to the contra legem limit for copy-out legislation?
A recent CJEU ruling which merits further discussion is the Second Chamber judgment in the case of Spedition Welter. 60 This judgment has tempted scholars to assert that the CJEU has extended the scope of the EU duty of consistent interpretation for copy-out legislation by requiring that such legislation must be interpreted in conformity with the applicable directive as construed by the CJEU regardless of whether it might be possible to do so or not under national law. 61 The CJEU allegedly interfered with the contra legem limit. Copy-out legislation refers to national implementing legislation which adopts the same wording as that of the statutory interpretation in Germany. In sum, the quality of the court's reasoning was simply
inadequate.
It appears from these circumstances of the individual case that both the Advocate General and the CJEU intended to issue a warning to national courts that they must take 25 of 36 court reaches the contra legem limit of interpretation. Needless to say, the CJEU did not promote a common European methodology for the interpretation of copy-out legislation.
Whether or not the warning issued to national courts will have its intended effect or indeed backfire is a more difficult question to answer. In the past, significantly gentler tones have been sufficient in order to nudge the German Federal Court of Justice to make interpretative U-turns. Heininger and Quelle are examples in point. In both cases, the referring German Federal Court of Justice felt unable to ascribe to the national law a meaning which, as it appeared after the decision of the CJEU, complied with the applicable directive. In neither case did the CJEU suggest to the national court that or how the national law is amenable to a consistent interpretation. Yet, when both cases returned to the German Federal Court of Justice,
it reached a directive-compliant reading using national methods of interpretation. 67 These two examples indicate that national courts leaning on the contra legem limit at the stage of referral should not be the prime concern of the CJEU. 68 The main concern should be courts which do not refer because they (a) claim that the national law cannot be interpreted in conformity with the alleged meaning of a directive as suggested by one of the parties to the proceedings because such an interpretation would be contra legem and (b) at the same time assert, and rightly so for proceedings exclusively between private parties, that the provision of the directive at issue does 26 of 36 not have direct effect. In this scenario, the correct interpretation of the directive will often do not have any bearing on the decision of the dispute, which is why German courts in the past have declined to refer to the CJEU even though they admitted that they were unsure about the correct interpretation of the directive. 69 It goes without saying that a refusal of national courts to cooperate with the CJEU by dodging the preliminary reference procedure seriously threatens the uniform interpretation and application of directives in the Member States. Whether the CJEU's perceived interference with the exclusive competence of the national court to interpret national law and its hard-line approach to consistent interpretation in Spedition Welter will convince those courts to refer seems rather questionable.
5.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EUROPEAN METHODOLOGICAL RULES AND NATIONAL LEGAL METHODOLOGIES
The fact that the CJEU refers to national rules of construction for the principle of consistent interpretation but at the same time has developed European methodological rules appears to be contradictory at first glance. This paradox can be resolved, however, as the following explanation of the relationship between national legal methods and European methodological rules shows. The following concepts (overlapping, intervention and Europeanisation from the inside) describe different layers of this relationship. These concepts are not mutually exclusive categories but can coexist in a domestic legal order as they can apply at the level of specific interpretative rules. If the substance of a European methodological rule is part of national principles of construction, the relationship between domestic law and EU rules can be described as follows.
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Even though there is an agreement about the content of the interpretative standard in the Union, some Member States may derive it from domestic law, whereas others may derive it from EU law. Different claims exist in the Union with regard to the same methodological content, which can either be attributed to the European legal order or the domestic legal order. These rival claims can coexist. They are not irreconcilable as they do not make competing claims over the legal basis of the same legal rule, but over the legal bases of different rules with the same content. Either domestic law claims legitimacy over a national principle of construction; or European law claims legitimacy over a European methodological rule. 70 The overlapping of European and national rules for the EU legal duty of consistent interpretation can be described as legal pluralism that exists within the European legal duty of consistent interpretation.
71
Legal pluralism is understood here as referring to the coexistence of legal orders or single rules, which are rooted in different sources of legitimacy, in the same social field.
72
Examples of overlapping can be found in English and German judgments. English courts apply a presumption that Parliament intends to give effect to the UK's international 70 We are not here concerned with the competing constitutional claims that the ultimate authority for the applicability of the objective of a particular enactment, which was expressed in the implementing statute's legislative history. 74 The court used national legal methodology to achieve this result and did not refer to the EU presumption of compliance.
B. Intervention
European methodological rules can intervene in national legal methodologies. A court must apply the European rules if they permit a consistent interpretation of legislation and if the court cannot reach the result sought by the directive by applying domestic standards alone. In this scenario, the European rules increase the scope for interpretation available to a judge. These rules do not simply add a separate and standalone layer to the interpretative process. The EU presumption of compliance interacts with the historical and purposive approach to statutory interpretation. Therefore, national principles of construction may need to adapt to the presumption rule in order to guarantee its effective operation. This adaptation is itself required The court also acknowledged that the government was mistaken as to the ambit of s. 72(1), i.e.
that the specific intention of the government was inadvertently inconsistent with the Information Society Directive. The Court of Appeal's omission to apply the priority element of the EU presumption of compliance was not, however, material to the outcome of the case.
That is because the court's supporting considerations exhibit an outer limit of consistent interpretation under English law, which rebuts the presumption: adopting the proposed consistent meaning would have resulted in making a policy choice which would have involved issues calling for legislative deliberation and which would have involved far-reaching practical repercussions which the court is not equipped to evaluate.
C. Europeanisation from the inside
If a court intends to achieve the full effectiveness of directives through an interpretation of domestic law, it may consider extending the scope of permissible judicial reasoning for consistent interpretation beyond existing national principles of construction and beyond the requirements of European methodological rules. Whether or not this is possible is determined by Member State law; it is referred to here as a "Europeanisation from the inside". 
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The hybrid conception of the doctrine recognises, at least to a certain extent, the autonomy and diversity of national cultures as judges can still employ their specific legal culture (traditions of interpretation). It builds on the presumption that legal cultures in Member
States are not static and may evolve 87 based on a European harmonisation programme but at the same time also accommodates sceptical voices 88 that suggest that legal cultures in Europe may not converge. This respect for diversity also manifests itself in the concept of overlapping.
Accommodating the different domestic legal orders may also increase the effectiveness of EU law. 89 It is not a given that a hybrid methodology will underperform a completely unified
European methodology for consistent interpretation on the scoreboard of the effectiveness of directives. A hybrid methodology reduces the chances of actual conflict between legal orders and arguably increases the acceptance of EU methodological rules within domestic legal orders. A hybrid methodology is a dynamic 90 compromise between the effectiveness of EU law areas of EU law as well 91 and which ultimately originates from the constitutional heart of the EU as a supranational institution "united in diversity" 92 . For some, such a hybrid methodology may represent the best theoretically available compromise. 92 Whether or not this tension originates from the constitutional heart of the EU is heavily contested. The preamble of the TFEU refers to an "ever closer Union"; a notion which seems to prioritise convergence over divergence, uniformity over diversity. For a detailed discussion of the matter see Interlegality is a result of legal pluralism and leads to hybridity.
7.

CONCLUSION
This article merged the fragments of a European methodological standard for consistent interpretation from the case law of the CJEU into a coherent framework labelled European methodological rules. These rules apply together with national legal methods and also interact with them via the concepts of overlapping, intervention and Europeanisation from the inside. 
